The Supreme Court split 4-4 in United States v. Texas on whether the President’s deferred action immigration program violates federal law. As a result, the Fifth Circuit’s nationwide temporary stay of the program remains in effect. Next, a trial court may rule on whether the program should be permanently stayed. Continue reading
It was a different crowd today at the Supreme Court. The number of children on the courthouse steps may have exceeded the number of adults, and the voices on the microphones were speaking English and Spanish.
United States v. Texas is about different things for different people. For some it is about keeping families together, for others executive overreach, and for about half of the states it is about “standing” to sue the federal government. Continue reading
In an already action packed term the Supreme Court has definitively secured this term’s place in history but agreeing to decide whether the President’s deferred action immigration program violates federal law or is unconstitutional. The Court will issue an opinion in United States v. Texas by the end of June 2016.
The Deferred Action for Parents of Americans (DAPA) program allows certain undocumented immigrants who have lived in the United States for five years and either came here as children or already have children who are U.S. citizens or permanent residents to lawfully stay and work temporarily in the United States. About 5 million people are affected.
Twenty six states sued the United States and won before the Fifth Circuit.
The Court will decide four legal issues in this case. Continue reading
This morning, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Frederick County v. Santos, No. 13-706, a case involving whether local officials may arrest persons for immigration violations that we discussed here. See additional coverage from The Frederick News-Post here.
That is the question presented in SCOTUSblog’s Petition of the Day. The Fourth Circuit ruled in Santos v. Frederick County Bd. of Comm’rs, 725 F.3d 451 (4th Cir. 2013), that
absent express direction or authorization by federal statute or federal officials, state and local law enforcement officers may not detain or arrest an individual solely based on known or suspected civil violations of federal immigration law.
- C.F. v. New York City Department of Education, No. 11-5003 (Mar. 4, 2014) (plaintiffs are entitled to tuition reimbursement under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act).
Last year, this blog discussed three recent courts of appeals decisions involving local-housing regulations aimed at a person’s immigration status.
Both decisions had preempted local ordinances.
Happy New Year to all of our readers.
Last week was a slow one for the courts. The only significant action for local governments came from the Ninth Circuit:
- The court granted rehearing en banc in Valenzuela v. Maricopa County, No. 11-16847 (Jan. 2, 2014). The case involves the constitutionality of Arizona’s Proposition 100, which provides that Arizona state courts may not set bail “[f]or serious felony offenses as prescribed by the legislature if the person charged has entered or remained in the United States illegally and if the proof is evident or the presumption great as to the present charge.” A Ninth-Circuit panel had previously upheld the measure, over a dissent from Judge Fisher.
- The court decided Alliance for Property Rights v. City of Idaho Falls, No. 12-35800 (Dec. 31, 2013). The court determined that the City of Idaho Falls, Idaho, may not exercise eminent domain outside of the City’s limits for the purpose of constructing electric-transmission lines.
- The court also amended an earlier decision in Wagner v. Maricopa County, No. 10-15501 (Dec. 30, 2013), which concerned the reasonableness of jail officers’ search of a pretrial detainee.
Can a local government prohibit the leasing of housing to persons who entered the United States illegally?
Since June, three federal courts of appeals have tackled that difficult question—and reached different results.
The decisions present a range of perspectives on whether local housing ordinances “conflict” with federal law or intrude upon a “field” reserved to the federal government. They highlight the uncertain contours of the preemption doctrine—and demonstrate the risk facing any local government that regulates in this space.