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Employers Lose Important Procedural Employment Discrimination Case

Posted in Case Notes Commentary IMLA Briefs Monday Morning Review on By Lann McIntyre

Before an employee alleging employment discrimination under Title VII (on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin) may bring a lawsuit in federal court he or she must file charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).

In Fort Bend County, Texas v. Davis the Supreme Court held unanimously that Title VII’s charge-filing requirement is a “mandatory procedural prescription” that a court must consider if timely raised (but may be forfeited if not timely asserted). The State and Local Legal Center (SLLC) filed an amicus brief arguing that the charge-filing requirement is jurisdictional, meaning it can be raised at any stage of the litigation. If the charge-filing requirement was jurisdictional and an employee failed to comply with it, a court would no longer have authority to hear the case.  ​

In her charge form to the EEOC, Lois Davis alleged that supervisors at Fort Bend County had sexually harassed her and retaliated against her. While her charge was pending, she was fired for refusing to come to work on a Sunday because of a commitment at church. While she updated her EEOC intake questionnaire to include religious discrimination she didn’t update the charge form.

The EEOC investigated and gave Davis permission to sue. She brought a religious discrimination claim and a claim for retaliation for reporting sexual harassment. Years into the litigation Fort Bend County argued the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the religious discrimination claim because Davis never included it in the charge form.

The Court, in an opinion written by Justice Ginsburg, held that Title VII’s charge-filing requirement is a mandatory but waivable claim-processing rule (which was waived in this case because Fort Bend waited so long to point out Davis didn’t comply with the charge-filing requirement). Continue reading →

 

Supreme Court Rules against State and Local Governments in Age Discrimination Case

Posted in Case Notes IMLA Briefs on By Lann McIntyre

In its first opinion of the term in Mt. Lemmon Fire District v. Guido the Supreme Court ruled 8-0 that the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) applies to state and local government employers with less than 20 employees. The State and Local Legal Center (SLLC) filed an amicus brief arguing that it should not apply. State and local governments often rely on small special districts to provide services they don’t provide.

John Guido was 46 and Dennis Rankin was 54 when they were laid off by the Mount Lemmon Fire District. They claim they were terminated because of their age in violation of the ADEA. They were the oldest of the district’s 11 employees.

The fire district argued that the ADEA does not apply to it because it employs fewer than 20 people. The Ninth Circuit disagreed.

The term “employer” is defined in the ADEA as a “person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 20 or more employees.” The definition goes on to say “[t]he term also means (1) any agent of such a person, and (2) a State or political subdivision of a State.” Continue reading →

 

Supreme Court to Decide Appellate Court Level to Review EEOC Subpoenas

Posted in Case Notes Commentary on By Lisa Soronen, Executive Director, SLLC

McLane v. EEOC is a case only an (employment) lawyer could love.

When the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) investigates allegations of employment discrimination if the employer refuses to provide the information the EEOC requests it will issue a subpoena demanding the employer produce the information. If the employer refuses to comply with the subpoena the EEOC may ask a court to enforce it. Continue reading →

 

Out of Style? Expecting Employees to Inform Employers about Religious Practices

Posted in Case Notes Commentary on By Lisa Soronen, Executive Director, SLLC

The Supreme Court’s final employment case of the term is a loss for all employers—not just clothing retailers that impose their fashion sense on their employees. As Justice Thomas points out in his dissenting opinion, rather remarkably, it leaves open the possibility that an employer can be liable for intentional discrimination for failing to accommodate a practice it did not know or even suspect was religious.

In EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores the Supreme Court held 8-1 that to bring a religious accommodation claim an applicant or employee need only show that his or her need for a religious accommodation was a motivating factor in an employment decision. The State and Local Legal Center (SLLC) filed an amicus brief, which IMLA attorneys wrote, arguing that to bring a failure to accommodate claim the applicant/employee should have to notify the employer of the need for a religious accommodation. Continue reading →