Supreme Court Holds Partisan Gerrymandering Claims May Not be Litigated

Posted in Case Notes Commentary on By Lann McIntyre

Research has shown that the more partisan gerrymandered a state legislature is, the more likely it is to preempt local ordinances. This case is important to local governments and to our democracy more generally.

In Rucho v. Common Cause the Supreme Court held 5-4 that partisan gerrymandering claims are non-justiciable—meaning that a federal court cannot decide them.

Partisan gerrymandering is the practice of drawing legislative districts to benefit one political party. In Davis v. Bandemer (1986) a majority of the Supreme Court held that partisan gerrymandering cases are justiciable. In that case and since then the Court has been unable to define a standard for when partisan dominance “is too much.” In Rucho v. Common Cause the Supreme Court announced it will stop trying.

Chief Justice Roberts wrote the majority opinion which his conservative colleagues joined (Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh). Unsurprisingly, the Court emphasized the role of state legislatures in districting:  “The Framers were aware of electoral districting problems and considered what to do about them. They settled on a characteristic approach, assigning the issue to the state legislatures, expressly checked and balanced by the Federal Congress.” Continue reading →

 

Employers Lose Important Procedural Employment Discrimination Case

Posted in Case Notes Commentary IMLA Briefs Monday Morning Review on By Lann McIntyre

Before an employee alleging employment discrimination under Title VII (on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin) may bring a lawsuit in federal court he or she must file charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).

In Fort Bend County, Texas v. Davis the Supreme Court held unanimously that Title VII’s charge-filing requirement is a “mandatory procedural prescription” that a court must consider if timely raised (but may be forfeited if not timely asserted). The State and Local Legal Center (SLLC) filed an amicus brief arguing that the charge-filing requirement is jurisdictional, meaning it can be raised at any stage of the litigation. If the charge-filing requirement was jurisdictional and an employee failed to comply with it, a court would no longer have authority to hear the case.  ​

In her charge form to the EEOC, Lois Davis alleged that supervisors at Fort Bend County had sexually harassed her and retaliated against her. While her charge was pending, she was fired for refusing to come to work on a Sunday because of a commitment at church. While she updated her EEOC intake questionnaire to include religious discrimination she didn’t update the charge form.

The EEOC investigated and gave Davis permission to sue. She brought a religious discrimination claim and a claim for retaliation for reporting sexual harassment. Years into the litigation Fort Bend County argued the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the religious discrimination claim because Davis never included it in the charge form.

The Court, in an opinion written by Justice Ginsburg, held that Title VII’s charge-filing requirement is a mandatory but waivable claim-processing rule (which was waived in this case because Fort Bend waited so long to point out Davis didn’t comply with the charge-filing requirement). Continue reading →

 

Justice Kavanaugh’s Surprising Oral Argument Questions in Partisan Gerrymandering Cases

Posted in Case Notes Commentary on By Lann McIntyre

The Supreme Court heard oral argument—yet again—in two cases arguing it should adopt a standard for when partisan gerrymandering is unconstitutional. Before argument court watchers were focused on Chief Justice Roberts, but during argument Justice Kavanaugh stole the show.

In 1986 in Davis v. Bandemer six Supreme Court Justices agreed that some amount of partisan gerrymandering is unconstitutional. But the Court has never laid out a test for making the determination.

Most recently, last term, with Justice Kennedy still on the bench, the Supreme Court again failed to articulate a standard for unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering. The two cases before the Court today came from North Carolina and Maryland favoring Republicans and Democrats, respectively. By almost any measure the gerrymanders were unapologetic and extreme.

Now that the Court has five solidly conservative members many have speculated that these Justices will rule that partisan gerrymandering claims raise non-justiciable political questions, effectively ending litigation over this question.

In oral argument last term Chief Justice Roberts, now the Court’s likely swing Justice, used the term “sociological gobbledygook” when expressing his skepticism about the Court being able to agree to a satisfactory test. Today, as is typical, the Chief asked questions of both side. For example, he questioned the merits of a test that assumes how people will vote based on past voting noting how often predictions of how people will vote are wrong. On the other hand, he acknowledged that the Maryland gerrymander “seems to be retaliation” and noted that the Supreme Court has an “established analysis” to deal with First Amendment retaliation claims. Continue reading →

 

Supreme Court to Decide Groundwater Clean Water Act Case

Posted in Case Notes IMLA Briefs on By Lann McIntyre

If a state or local government discharges a pollutant from a point source to a navigable water it must obtain a permit under the Clean Water Act (CWA). But what if that pollutant is conveyed in something—say groundwater—between the point source and the navigable water? Must the state or local government still obtain a permit? That is the question the Supreme Court will decide next term in County of Maui, Hawaii v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund.

Maui County injects treated wastewater from wells into the groundwater. Some of the treated wastewater reaches the Pacific Ocean. The Hawaii Wildlife Fund sued the County arguing it was required to obtain a permit under the CWA for these discharges. Continue reading →

 

Supreme Court Rules against State and Local Governments in Age Discrimination Case

Posted in Case Notes IMLA Briefs on By Lann McIntyre

In its first opinion of the term in Mt. Lemmon Fire District v. Guido the Supreme Court ruled 8-0 that the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) applies to state and local government employers with less than 20 employees. The State and Local Legal Center (SLLC) filed an amicus brief arguing that it should not apply. State and local governments often rely on small special districts to provide services they don’t provide.

John Guido was 46 and Dennis Rankin was 54 when they were laid off by the Mount Lemmon Fire District. They claim they were terminated because of their age in violation of the ADEA. They were the oldest of the district’s 11 employees.

The fire district argued that the ADEA does not apply to it because it employs fewer than 20 people. The Ninth Circuit disagreed.

The term “employer” is defined in the ADEA as a “person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 20 or more employees.” The definition goes on to say “[t]he term also means (1) any agent of such a person, and (2) a State or political subdivision of a State.” Continue reading →

 

Supreme Court to Decide Off-Reservation Hunting Case

Posted in Case Notes on By Lann McIntyre

Herrera v. Wyoming is a case of dueling Supreme Court precedent.

Clayvin Herrera, a member of the Crow tribe, shot an elk in Big Horn National Forest in Wyoming. He was charged with hunting without a license during a closed season. Herrera claims that an 1868 treaty giving the Crow the right to hunt on the “unoccupied lands of the United States” allowed him to hunt on this land.

In Herrera v. Wyoming the Supreme Court will decide whether Wyoming’s admission to the Union or the establishment of the Big Horn National Forest abrogated the Crow’s treaty right to hunt in Big Horn National Forest.

To decide this case the lower court applied a 1995 Tenth Circuit decision Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis, which raised the same question. In Repsis, the Tenth Circuit held that the “Tribe’s right to hunt . . .  was repealed by the act admitting Wyoming into the Union” and that “the creation of the Big Horn National Forest resulted in the ‘occupation’ of the land.” Continue reading →

 

States Win Online Sales Tax Case

Posted in Case Notes Commentary IMLA Briefs on By Lann McIntyre

In South Dakota v. Wayfair the Supreme Court ruled that states and local governments can require vendors with no physical presence in the state to collect sales tax. According to the Court, in a 5-4 decision, “economic and virtual contacts” are enough to create a “substantial nexus” with the state allowing the state to require collection.

In 1967 in National Bellas Hess  v. Department of Revenue of Illinois, the Supreme Court held that per its Commerce Clause jurisprudence, states and local governments cannot require businesses to collect sales tax unless the business has a physical presence in the state.

Twenty-five years later in Quill v. North Dakota (1992), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the physical presence requirement but admitted that “contemporary Commerce Clause jurisprudence might not dictate the same result” as the Court had reached in Bellas Hess.

Customers buying from remote sellers still owe sales tax but they rarely pay it when the remote seller does not collect it. Congress had the authority to overrule Bellas Hess and Quill, but never did so. Continue reading →

 

Supreme Court Hears Oral Argument in Internet Sales Tax Case

Posted in Case Notes Commentary on By Lann McIntyre

In South Dakota v. Wayfair South Dakota is asking the Supreme Court to overrule precedent and hold that state and local governments may require retailers with no in-state physical presence to collect sales tax. The National Conference of State Legislatures estimated that states lost $23.3 billion in 2012 from being prohibited from collecting sales tax from online and catalog purchases.

In 1967 in National Bellas Hess  v. Department of Revenue of Illinois, the Supreme Court held that per its Commerce Clause jurisprudence, states and local governments cannot require businesses to collect sales tax unless the business has a physical presence in the state.

Twenty-five years later in Quill v. North Dakota (1992), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the physical presence requirement but admitted that “contemporary Commerce Clause jurisprudence might not dictate the same result” as the Court had reached in Bellas Hess.

Customers buying from remote sellers still owe sales tax but they rarely pay it when the remote seller does not collect it. Congress has the authority to overrule Bellas Hess and Quill but has thus far not done so.

Even before oral argument South Dakota could count three votes likely in favor of overturning Bellas Hess and Quill. In March 2015, Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion stating that the “legal system should find an appropriate case for this Court to reexamine Quill.” While on the Tenth Circuit then-judge Gorsuch wrote an opinion strongly implying that given the opportunity the Supreme Court should overrule Quill. Finally, while Justice Thomas voted against North Dakota in Quill he has since rejected the concept of the dormant Commerce Clause, on which the Quill decisions rests.

At oral argument Justices Kennedy and Gorsuch asked Wayfair’s attorney different lines of questions both of which indicated they remain anti-Quill. Justice Thomas, as always, was silent. The most vocal champion of overturning Quill was Justice Ginsburg. She said the Court needs to take responsibility for overturning precedent it created which is no longer appropriate in the current economy instead of relying on Congress to act.

Justice Breyer was clearly torn about the case. He said he read both sides’ briefs and concluded both positions were “absolutely right.” He looked to the attorneys arguing for both sides to help sort out issues including exactly how much money is on the table, whether it really is easy and inexpensive to collect sales tax, and whether tax collection should be retroactive.

Justice Sotomayor lead the charge defending Quill, asking South Dakota’s attorney about many of the same issues Justice Breyer raised—but taking a more certain approach that the answers were known and point to keeping Quill the law of the land. Justice Kagan asked a number of questions expressing the view that Congress should overturn Quill, if it wants to, given that Congress can craft a more complicated solution than the Court can. Justice Alito also didn’t seem particularly sympathetic to South Dakota’s position suggesting that if Quill was overturned states would “grab everything they could” rather than exempt small businesses from having to collect.

Chief Justice Roberts asked questions of both sides, something he has done more often since Justice Scalia died. His questions unfavorable to South Dakota focused on, among other things, the burden of requiring small businesses to collect sales tax and honoring Congress’s decision to leave things the way they are.

The Supreme Court will issue an opinion in this case by the end of June.

Authored By:

Lisa Soronen

Executive Director

State & Local Legal Center

444 North Capitol Street, N.W., Suite 515

Washington, D.C. 20001

Phone: (202) 434-4845

Fax: (202) 737-1069

Email: lsoronen@sso.org

Website: http://www.statelocallc.org/

Twitter: @SLLCSCOTUS

 

Supreme Court Hears Oral Argument in Maryland Partisan Gerrymandering Case

Posted in Case Notes Commentary Roundup on By Lann McIntyre

The challengers to the redistricting of Maryland’s Sixth Congressional District just might win—if the Supreme Court actually decides their case.

In Benisek v. Lamone in 2011 the Maryland legislature needed to move about 10,000 voters out of the Sixth Congressional District to comply with “one-person one-vote.” It moved about 360,000 Marylanders out of the district and about 350,000 Marylanders in the district. As a result only 34 percent of voters were registered Republican versus 47 percent before redistricting.

Following the redistricting, Democrat John Delaney defeated the incumbent Republican by almost 21 percent. But two years later in 2014 Delaney almost lost his seat even though his challenger didn’t live in the district and raised less money. Two years after that, Republican Larry Hogan won the Sixth District, beating his rival by 14 percent.

A number of Sixth District Republicans sued alleging the state legislature “targeted them for vote dilution because of their past support for Republican candidates for public office, violating the First Amendment retaliation doctrine.”

In 2016, a three-judge court articulated a standard for when partisan gerrymandering violates the First Amendment. But two of the judges weren’t convinced that the challengers were able to demonstrate that but-for the partisan gerrymander, Republicans would have won and continued winning in the Sixth District. Continue reading →

 

Justice Gorsuch Silent During Significant Union Dues Oral Argument

Posted in Case Notes Commentary Roundup on By Lann McIntyre

If there ever was a case where the vote of only one Justice is likely to matter it is Janus v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees. All attention was focused on Justice Gorsuch yesterday morning as the Supreme Court held oral argument in this case. And, he was…silent.

The Court will decide the constitutionality of state statutes allowing public sector employers and unions to agree that employees who don’t join the union must still pay their “fair share” of collective bargaining costs. More than 20 states authorize fair share for public sector employees.

In Abood v. Detroit Board of Education (1997) the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment does not prevent “agency shop” arrangements where public employees who do not join the union are still required to pay their “fair share” of union dues for collective-bargaining, contract administration, and grievance-adjustment. The rationale for an agency fee is that the union may not discriminate between members and nonmembers in performing these functions. So no free-riders are allowed.

Why is only Justice Gorsuch’s vote likely at play in this case? Continue reading →

 

Supreme Court Agrees to Hear State and Local Government Antitrust Case

Posted in Case Notes Commentary on By Lann McIntyre

The state-action immunity doctrine may be obscure but that doesn’t stop the Supreme Court for accepting a steady diet of cases involving the issue.
State-action immunity provides states and, in some instances, local governments immunity from federal antitrust liability. In Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District v. SolarCity the Supreme Court will decide whether a lower court’s refusal to rule state-action immunity applies to a particular entity may be appealed immediately or only after the case is fully litigated.
Continue reading →

 

Federal District Court Rules in Favor of Philadelphia in Sanctuary Jurisdiction Case

Posted in Case Notes Commentary Roundup on By Lann McIntyre

Congress created the Edward Byrne Justice Assistance Grants (Byrne JAG) in 2005 to provide “flexible” funding for state and local police departments. In April 2017 the Department of Justice (DOJ) required Philadelphia (and eight other jurisdictions) to provide documentation that it complies with 8 U.S.C. 1373, which prohibits states and local governments from restricting employees from sharing immigration status information with federal immigration officials.

Philadelphia sued Attorney General Jeff Sessions arguing that the City complies with 8 U.S.C. 1373. A federal district court in Philadelphia agreed and issued a preliminary injunction preventing Sessions from denying the City Byrne JAG grant funding. Continue reading →

 

Supreme Court Accepts First Amendment Retaliatory Arrest Case

Posted in Case Notes Commentary Roundup on By Lann McIntyre

Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach is a double redux. The Supreme Court ruled on this case in 2013 on a maritime issue. The Court agreed to decide the issue this case presents in 2011, but ultimately failed to rule on it then.

What if a police officer arrests someone in retaliation for engaging in speech protected by the First Amendment but the officer also had probable cause to arrest that person for a different, legitimate reason? In Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach the Supreme Court will decide whether that person may sue the police officer for violating his or her First Amendment rights. Continue reading →

 

Is the Third Travel Ban Likely to be Reviewed by the Supreme Court?

Posted in Case Notes Commentary Roundup on By Lann McIntyre

If Attorney General Jeff Sessions has his way the answer will be yes he told the Senate Judiciary Committee shortly after two federal district courts temporarily prevented the third travel ban from going into effect.

The president’s March 6 executive order (the second travel ban) prevented people from six predominately Muslim countries from entering the United States for 90 days. In June, the Supreme Court temporarily prevented the ban from going into effect against those with a “bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United State” until the Court could hear the case on the merits in early October.

The second travel ban was set to expire on September 24. That day the President issued a presidential proclamation (the third travel ban) indefinitely banning immigration from six countries:  Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, and Yemen. Persons from some of these countries and Venezuela also may not receive particular non-immigrant visas. Following the presidential proclamation, the Supreme Court dismissed the case challenging the second travel ban.

Shortly before the third travel ban was supposed to go into effect federal district courts in Hawaii and Maryland issued temporary injunctions blocking it.

Continue reading →

 

South Dakota Asks U.S. Supreme Court to Accept Sales Tax Case

Posted in Case Notes Commentary IMLA Briefs Monday Morning Review on By Lann McIntyre

South Dakota has filed a petition in South Dakota v. Wayfair asking the U.S. Supreme Court to hear a challenge to its law requiring out-of-state retailers to collect sales tax.

In Quill Corp. v. North Dakota (1992), the Supreme Court held that states cannot require retailers with no in-state physical presence to collect sales tax.

In March 2015, Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion stating that the “legal system should find an appropriate case for this Court to reexamine Quill.” Justice Kennedy criticized Quill in Direct Marketing Association v. Brohl for many of the same reasons the State and Local Legal Center stated in its amicus brief. Specifically, internet sales have risen astronomically since 1992 and states and local governments are unable to collect most taxes due on sales from out-of-state vendors.

Following the Kennedy opinion a number of state legislatures passed legislation requiring remote vendors to collect sales tax. South Dakota’s law is the first to be ready for review by the U.S. Supreme Court. In September the South Dakota Supreme Court ruled that the South Dakota law is unconstitutional because it clearly violates Quill and it is up to the U.S. Supreme Court to overrule it.  Continue reading →

 

Supreme Court Accepts Two Car Search Cases

Posted in Case Notes Commentary Monday Morning Review on By Lann McIntyre

At the Supreme Court’s “long conference,” where it decides which petitions—that have been piling up all summer—to accept, the Court agreed to hear two unrelated cases involving car searches.

Per the Fourth Amendment police officers generally need a warrant to search a car. However,  the automobile exception allows officers to search a car that is “readily mobile” without a warrant if officers have probable cause to believe they will find contraband or a crime has been committed.

 Collins v. Virginia raises the question of whether the automobile exception applies to a car that is parked on private property. Continue reading →

 

Supreme Court to Hear Significant Public Sector Union Dues Case (Again)

Posted in Case Notes Commentary on By Lann McIntyre

In 2016, the Supreme Court was expected to overrule a nearly 40-year old precedent requiring public sector employees who don’t join the union to pay their “fair share” of collective bargaining costs. Justice Scalia died shortly after the Court heard oral argument in Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association. The Court ultimately issued a 4-4 decision which, practically speaking, kept Abood v. Detroit Board of Education (1977) on the books.

With a ninth Justice now on the bench the Supreme Court has agreed to try again to decide whether to overturn Abood in Janus v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees. More than 20 states authorize fair share for public sector employees.

In Abood the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment does not prevent “agency shop” arrangements where public employees who do not join the union are still required to pay their “fair share” of union dues for collective-bargaining, contract administration, and grievance-adjustment. The rationale for an agency fee is that the union may not discriminate between members and nonmembers in performing these functions. So, no free-riders are allowed. Continue reading →

 

Federal District Court Rejects Obama Overtime Rule

Posted in Case Notes Commentary Monday Morning Review on By Lann McIntyre

A federal district judge in Texas has invalidated Obama overtime regulations which would have made it more likely states and local governments would have had to pay more employees overtime.

Per the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), executive, administrative, and professional “white collar” employees do not have to be paid overtime if they work more than 40 hours a week. Per Department of Labor (DOL) regulations, adopted shortly after the FLSA was adopted in 1938, employees must perform specific duties and earn a certain salary to be exempt from overtime as white collar employees.

On May 23, 2016, DOL issued final rules nearly doubling the previous salary level test for white collar employees from $455 per week, or $23,660 per year, to $913 per week, or $47,476 per year. The rules also automatically updates the salary level every three years for white collar employees.

According to the Judge Mazzant, DOL does not have the authority to adopt a salary test that effectively eliminates the duties test, which is what the final rule does. The text of the final rule explicitly says that those earning less than $913 will be eligible for overtime “irrespective of their job duties and responsibilities.” The court likewise concluded that the automatic updating mechanism is unlawful.　 Continue reading →

 

Supreme Court Accepts Prisoner Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Case

Posted in Case Notes Commentary Monday Morning Review on By Lann McIntyre

In an unusual move, the Supreme Court accepted a case during its summer recess.  Like most of its docket, this case will affect states and local governments.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) states that when an inmate recovers money damages in a confinement conditions case “a portion of the judgment (not to exceed 25 percent)” shall be applied to his or her attorney’s fees award. The question the Supreme Court will decide in Murphy v. Smith is whether “not to exceed 25 percent” means up to 25 percent or exactly 25 percent.

A jury awarded inmate Charles Murphy about $300,000 in damages relating to an officer crushing his eye socket and leaving him unconscious in a cell without checking his condition.

The trial judge awarded Murphy’s attorney about $100,000 in fees and allocated 10 percent of Murphy’s damages award to attorney’s fees (about $30,000). Continue reading →

 

SLLC Files Supreme Court Amicus Brief in Statute of Limitations Case Involving a City

Posted in Case Notes Commentary IMLA Briefs Monday Morning Review on By Lann McIntyre

Federalism cases raise legal issues big and small, pedestrian and esoteric.

The very simple question in Artis v. District of Columbia is what does it mean for a statute of limitations to “toll” under 28 U.S.C 1367(d)? The State and Local Legal Center (SLLC) filed a Supreme Court amicus brief agreeing with the District of Columbia’s interpretation of “toll.”

A year after the fact, Stephanie Artis sued the District of Columbia in federal court bringing a number of federal and state law claims related to her termination as a code inspector. It took the federal district court over two and a half years to rule on her claims. It dismissed her sole federal claim as “facially deficient” and no longer had jurisdiction to decide the state law claims.

28 U.S.C 1367(d) states that statutes of limitations for state law claims pending in federal court shall be “tolled” for a period of 30 days after they are dismissed (unless state law provides a longer tolling period).

While Artis was waiting for the federal district court to rule, the three-year statutes of limitations on all her state law claims passed. She waited 59 days to re-file her claims in state court after the federal district court dismissed her case.

Was her claim timely? The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held no.   Continue reading →

 

SLLC Files Supreme Court Amicus Brief in Voter Roll Maintenance Case

Posted in Case Notes Commentary IMLA Briefs on By Lann McIntyre

Maintaining accurate voter rolls means walking a fine line.

 In Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Institute the Supreme Court will decide whether federal law allows states and local governments to remove people from the voter rolls if the state or local government sends them a confirmation notice after they haven’t voted for two years, they don’t respond to the notice, and then they don’t vote in the next four years.

 While Ohio is being sued in this case, twelve other states use a similar process. The State and Local Legal Center (SLLC) filed an amicus brief in this case supporting Ohio.

 The National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) says that roll maintenance procedures “shall not result in” people being removed from the polls for failure to vote. The Help America Vote Act modified the NVRA to say that states may remove voters if they don’t respond to a confirmation notice and don’t vote in the next two federal election cycles. Continue reading →

 

States and Local Governments Win Takings Case

Posted in Case Notes Commentary IMLA Briefs on By Lann McIntyre

Good news for local governments with “merger” ordinances: you can keep them on the books.

　It has been a number of years since states and local governments have won a property rights case. But in Murr v. Wisconsin the Supreme Court concluded 5-3 that no taking occurred where state law and local ordinances “merged” nonconforming, adjacent lots under common ownership, meaning the property owners could not sell one of the lots by itself. The State and Local Legal Center (SLLC), filed an amicus brief, which the Court cited two times, arguing that these very common provisions are constitutional.　

　The Murrs owned contiguous lots E and F, which together are .98 acres. Lot F contained a cabin and lot E was undeveloped. State law and a St. Croix County merger ordinance prohibit the individual development or sale of adjacent lots under common ownership that are less than one acre total. A grandfather clause allows for the sale and development of separately owned substandard lots purchased before the statute and ordinance went into effect.

     The Murrs sought and were denied a variance to sell Lot E to finance moving the cabin on Lot F. They claimed the ordinance resulted in an unconstitutional uncompensated taking. Continue reading →

 

Supreme Court to Rule on Travel Ban

Posted in Case Notes Commentary on By Lann McIntyre

On its last opinion day of the term, the Supreme Court announced that it would rule on the constitutionality of the Trump administration’s revised travel ban. In the meantime, to the extent the executive order prevents foreign nationals and refugees “who lack any bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States” from entering the United States, it may go into effect until the Supreme Court rules on the merits of this case.

The president’s first executive order prevented people from seven predominantly Muslim countries from entering the United States for 90 days, froze decisions on refugee applications for 120 days, and capped total refugee admissions at 50,000 for fiscal year 2017.

The Ninth Circuit temporarily struck it down, concluding this executive order was not religion-neutral, and that it likely violated the due process rights of lawful permanent residents, nonimmigrant visa holders, and refugees.

The president’s second executive order prevents people from six predominately Muslim countries from entering the United States for 90 days, but only applies to new visa applicants and allows for case-by-case waivers, and contains the same provisions regarding refugees as the original travel ban.

The Fourth Circuit concluded the revised travel ban likely violates the Establishment Clause, noting that its “text speaks with vague words of national security but in context drips with religious intolerance, animus and discrimination.” It temporarily prevented the portion of the executive order regarding admission to the United States for 90 days from going into effect.

The Ninth Circuit concluded that the revised travel ban likely exceeds the power granted to the President by Congress in the Immigration and Nationality Act. It temporarily prevented all of the provisions mentioned above from going into effect, including those affecting refugees. Continue reading →

 

Supreme Court Rules Trademarks Aren’t Government Speech

Posted in Case Notes on By Lann McIntyre

Local governments don’t particularly care that trademarks aren’t government speech. But they do care about the breadth of the government speech doctrine because government speech is not protected by the First Amendment (meaning governments can say what they want and exclude messages they disagree with).

In Matal v. Tam Justice Alito, writing for the majority, noted that Walker v. Texas (2005) “likely marks the outer bounds of the government-speech doctrine.” In Walker the Court held that messages on specialty license plates are government speech.

Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act bars the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) from registering marks that disparage persons and institutions. Simon Tam named his band The Slants to “reclaim” and “take ownership” of Asian stereotypes. The PTO refused to register the band name concluding a “substantial composite of people” would find it offensive. Tam sued the PTO arguing that Section 2(a) violates the First Amendment Free Speech Clause.

Among other arguments, the Supreme Court rejected the federal government’s claim that trademarks are government speech or a form of government subsidy.

In rejecting the argument that trademarks are government speech, the Court noted that none of the factors present in Walker are present in this case. Specifically, license plates have long been used to convey state messages; are closely identified with the state as they are manufactured, owned, and generally designed by the state; and Texas directly controlled the messages conveyed on specialty plates.

Continue reading →

 

Supreme Court Sex Offender Social Networking Case Relevant to Local Governments

Posted in Case Notes IMLA Briefs on By Lann McIntyre

In Packingham v. North Carolina the Supreme Court ruled unanimously that a North Carolina law making it a felony for a registered sex offender to access social networking sites where minors can create profiles violates the First Amendment Free Speech Clause. The State and Local Legal Center (SLLC) filed an amicus brief arguing for the opposite result.

Lester Packingham was charged with violating the North Carolina statute because he praised God on Facebook when a parking ticket was dismissed.

This case may not see particularly relevant to local governments. But, if a statute (or ordinance) limits speech based on content, it is subject to strict (nearly always fatal) scrutiny. In Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona (2015), the Supreme Court held that the definition of content-based is very broad.

The SLLC amicus brief argued, among other things, that the North Carolina law isn’t content-based, contrary to the opinion of a dissenting North Carolina Supreme Court judge. A conviction under the statute does not turn on the content of the speech; it turns on whether sex offenders have accessed websites where minors can maintain profiles.

The Supreme Court assumed the statute was content-neutral but held that it is too broad to withstand even less rigorous intermediate scrutiny. So, practically speaking, the Supreme Court didn’t expand or clarify the definition of content-based in Packingham.   Continue reading →

 

Supreme Court to Consider Constitutionality of Partisan Gerrymandering

Posted in Case Notes Commentary Monday Morning Review on By Lann McIntyre

In Gill v. Whitford the Supreme Court has agreed to decide whether and when it is possible to bring a claim that partisan gerrymandering is unconstitutional.

While the Court has repeatedly struck down district maps that rely on racial gerrymandering, it has never ruled that maps drawn to secure partisan advantage are unconstitutional. In 2004, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy – who may be the deciding vote in Whitford – wrote a concurring opinion indicating that partisan gerrymandering could be unconstitutional.

In 2011, Wisconsin legislators redrew state assembly districts to reflect population changes recorded in the 2010 census. Map makers used a model designed to predict the likelihood that various proposed districts would elect a Republican. In the 2015 election, Republican candidates received less than 49% of the statewide vote and won seats in more than 60% of the state’s assembly districts; and, in 2014, 52 percent of the vote yielded 63 seats for Republicans.

The challengers propose a standard for determining the influence of partisan gerrymandering in the district-drawing process. Drawn from a 2015 article written by a University of Chicago law professor and a lawyer for the challengers, the standard is based on “wasted votes”–votes in each district cast for a non-winning party’s candidate. By dividing the difference between the sums of each party’s wasted votes by the total number of votes cast, the proposed standard yields an efficiency gap. Continue reading →

 

Travel Ban Headed to the Supreme Court?

Posted in Case Notes Commentary on By Lann McIntyre

The Department of Justice (DOJ) has filed a brief asking the Supreme Court to review the Fourth Circuit’s recent decision temporarily preventing the President’s revised travel ban from going into effect. Numerous states supported both side as amici in the litigation. Numerous local governments supported the challengers.

 The President’s first executive order prevented people from seven predominately Muslim countries from entering the United States for 90 days. The Ninth Circuit temporarily struck it down concluding it likely violated the due process rights of lawful permanent residents, non-immigrant visa holders, and refugees.

 The President’s second executive order prevents people from six predominately Muslim countries from entering the United States for 90 days but only applies to new visa applicants and allows for case-by-case waivers.  Continue reading →

 

State and Local Governments Win Excessive Force Police Case

Posted in Case Notes IMLA Briefs on By Lann McIntyre

No matter the legal issue, excessive forces cases are difficult for state and local governments to win because they often involve injury or death (in this case of a totally innocent person). To win one unanimously likely says something about the problematic nature of the legal theory.

In County of Los Angeles v. Mendez the Supreme Court rejected the “provocation rule,” where police officers using reasonable force may be liable for violating the Fourth Amendment because they committed a separate Fourth Amendment violation that contributed to their need to use force. The State and Local Legal Center (SLLC) filed an amicus brief asking the Supreme Court to reject the Ninth Circuit’s provocation rule.

Police officers entered the shack Mendez was living in without a warrant and unannounced. Mendez thought the officers were the property owner and picked up the BB gun he used to shoot rats so he could stand up. When the officers saw the gun, they shot him resulting in his leg being amputated below the knee.

The Ninth Circuit concluded that the use of force in this case was reasonable. But it concluded the officers were liable per the provocation rule–the officers brought about the shooting by entering the shack without a warrant. (The Ninth Circuit granted the officers qualified immunity for failing to knock-and-announce themselves.) The Ninth Circuit also concluded that provocation rule aside, the officers were liable for causing the shooting because it was “reasonably foreseeable” that the officers would encounter an armed homeowner when they “barged into the shack unannounced.”  Continue reading →

 

North Carolina Loses Supreme Court Redistricting Case

Posted in Case Notes Commentary on By Lann McIntyre

North Carolina has had a tough time in the Supreme Court in the last two weeks. Last week the Court refused to review the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeal’s decision holding that North Carolina’s voter ID law is unconstitutional and violates the Voting Rights Act. This week it concluded two congressional districts are unconstitutional racial gerrymanders.

Cooper v. Harris raises an issue litigated over and over since the 2010 census. Challengers claim the North Carolina legislature unconstitutionally packed minority voters into a few legislative districts to lessen their ability to influence races in other districts. The Supreme Court agreed, holding 5-3 that a North Carolina District Court correctly ruled that North Carolina relied too heavily on race in designing two majority-minority congressional districts. Continue reading →

 

Supreme Court Tentatively Allows City Claims Against Banks for Discriminatory Lending to Proceed

Posted in Case Notes Commentary IMLA Briefs on By Lann McIntyre

The glass is more than half full after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Bank of America v. Miami , but not as full as local governments would like. The Supreme Court could have completely shut down local government lawsuits against banks for discriminatory lending practices—but it didn’t. The Supreme Court also could have made it easier for local governments to prove these cases—but it didn’t.

In Bank of America v. Miami , the Supreme Court held 5-3 that local governments have “standing” to bring Fair Housing Act (FHA) lawsuits against banks alleging discriminatory lending practices. But to win these claims local governments must show that their injuries were more than merely foreseeable. The State and Local Legal Center (SLLC) filed an amicus brief in this case on the side of the City of Miami.    Continue reading →

 

Sanctuary Jurisdictions Executive Order Struck Down

Posted in Commentary on By Lann McIntyre

A federal district court has issued a nationwide preliminary injunction preventing the Trump administration from enforcing the sanctuary jurisdictions portion of the Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States executive order (EO).

The court was asked to accept two very different versions of what this EO means to determine whether it had jurisdiction to hear this case. The most important dispute between the parties is how much federal funding is on the line. The judge chose the Santa Clara and San Francisco version, accusing the Department of Justice (DOJ) of trying to “read out all of Section 9(a)’s unconstitutional directives to render it an ominous, misleading, and ultimately toothless threat.”

Section 9 of the EO says that jurisdictions that refuse to comply with 8 U.S.C. 1373 are ineligible to receive federal grants. On its face, Section 1373 prohibits local governments from restricting employee communication of immigration status information to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Continue reading →

 

Seventh Circuit Holds Employees May Bring Sexual Orientation Employment Discrimination Claims

Posted in Case Notes Commentary on By Lann McIntyre

The Seventh Circuit has become the first federal circuit court of appeals to rule that employees may bring sexual orientation discrimination claims under Title VII. This case directly affects state and local governments in their capacity as employers in Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for employers to discriminate on the basis of a person’s “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”

Kimberly Hively is openly lesbian. She sued Ivy Tech Community College where she taught as a part-time, adjunct professor. She applied for at least six full-time positions between 2009 and 2014, didn’t receive any of them, and in July 2014, her part-time contract was not renewed. She believes her sexual orientation is the reason.

The Seventh Circuit had long held that sexual orientation discrimination claims weren’t cognizable under Title VII. The court decided to revisit this conclusion “in light of developments at the Supreme Court extending over two decades.” These decisions include Obergefell v. Hodges (2015), which granted same-sex couples a constitutional right to marry.  Continue reading →

 

WOTUS to Stay at SCOTUS

Posted in Case Notes Commentary on By Lann McIntyre

The Trump administration asked the Supreme Court to hold “in abeyance” litigation over whether a federal district court or a federal court of appeals has jurisdiction to rule whether the current 2015 Waters of the United States (WOTUS) definitional rule violates the Clean Water Act. On April 2, 2017 the Supreme Court denied the motion, allowing the litigation to proceed.

President Trump’s February 28, 2017 executive order Restoring the Rule of Law, Federalism, and Economic Growth by Reviewing the “Waters of the United States” Rule calls for the “rescinding or revising” of the WOTUS rule. Many state and local governments objected to the broad nature of this rule, in particular to the expansive definition of ditches and the ambiguous definition of tributaries.  Continue reading →

 

What Will Happen Now to the Clean Power Plan Litigation?

Posted in Case Notes Commentary on By Lann McIntyre

While President Trump’s executive order (EO) on Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth merely calls for the “review” of the Clean Power Plan (CPP), it has been widely viewed as the President’s first step to dismantle President Obama’s signature climate change measure. The EO goes on to say that after review, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) “if appropriate, shall, as soon as practicable, suspend, revise, or rescind the guidance, or publish for notice and comment proposed rules suspending, revising, or rescinding those rules.”

According to the CPP, by 2030 carbon pollution from the power sector is supposed to be 32 percent below 2005 levels. State-by-state targets are to be accomplished by increased production of renewable energy.

A number of states sued the Obama administration claiming the CPP regulations exceeded EPA’s authority under the Clean Air Act. In February 2016, the Supreme Court prevented the CPP regulations from going into effect until the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals (and the Supreme Court, if it chooses to) rules on the regulations. Continue reading →

 

SCOTUS Rules Statute Banning Credit-Card Surcharges Regulates Speech

Posted in Case Notes Commentary IMLA Briefs on By Lann McIntyre

Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman is the Supreme Court’s first First Amendment free speech ruling since Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona (2015), where the Supreme Court defined content-based speech very broadly and held it is subject to strict (usually fatal) scrutiny. The Court didn’t cite to Reed in its opinion in this newly decided case.

The Court held unanimously that a New York statute prohibiting vendors from advertising a single price, and a statement that credit card customers must pay more, regulates speech under the First Amendment. The State and Local Legal Center (SLLC) filed an amicus brief in this case arguing this law doesn’t violate the First Amendment because it regulates conduct rather than speech.

When customers pay with a credit card, merchants must pay a transaction fee to the credit card company. Some merchants want to pass this fee along to credit card customers. But a New York statute states that “[n]o seller in any sales transaction may impose a surcharge on a [credit card] holder who elects to use a credit card in lieu of payment by cash, check, or similar means.” Twelve states have adopted credit-card surcharge bans. Continue reading →

 

Supreme Court Rejects Judge Gorsuch’s View of Special Education Law

Posted in Case Notes Commentary Monday Morning Review on By Lann McIntyre

The Supreme Court’s decision in Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District was bad timing for Supreme Court nominee Judge Neil Gorsuch.

The Supreme Court held unanimously that public school districts must offer students with disabilities an individual education plan (IEP) “reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.”

The Court rejected the Tenth Circuit’s holding that an IEP must merely confer “some educational benefit” that is “more than de minimis.”

This ruling came down while Judge Gorsuch was testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee. Judge Gorsuch was the author of a 2008 opinion Continue reading →

 

Gorsuch Confirmation Hearings and States and Local Governments: Days 1-3 Update

Posted in Commentary on By Lann McIntyre

Confirmation hearings generally follow a predictable course; Judge Gorsuch’s hearings have been no exception. Senators from the other side of the aisle as the President ask the nominee pointed questions on controversial topics which the nominee does his or her best to politely avoid answering. As a result, many issues of interest to states and local governments receive little meaningful attention.

While a friendly Senator (Flake, R-AZ) asked Judge Gorsuch whether a particular case he ruled in was consistent with the “principle of states as laboratories of democracy” and another friendly Senator (Crapo, R-ID) asked Judge Gorsuch to discuss the Tenth Amendment, federalism was rarely discussed as such and preemption wasn’t discussed at all. Likewise, many of the issues of particular importance to local governments—qualified immunity and property rights—also were not discussed.

Judge Gorsuch did say Continue reading →

 

One Step Closer to the Supreme Court Ruling on Quill

Posted in Case Notes Commentary on By Lann McIntyre

In  S. Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7669, a state trial court judge in South Dakota has ruled that a South Dakota law requiring remote sellers to collect sales tax is unconstitutional. This ruling was expected for precisely the reason the judge stated—a lower court must follow Supreme Court precedent.  

 In Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, decided in 1992, the Supreme Court held that states cannot require retailers with no in-state physical presence to collect sales tax. The South Dakota law directly contradicts this precedent. Continue reading →

 

Supreme Court Will Not Decide Transgender Bathroom Case

Posted in Case Notes Commentary Monday Morning Review on By Lann McIntyre

The Supreme Court will not decide—at least not this term—whether transgender students have a right to use the bathroom consistent with their gender identity due to changes in position on this issue from the Obama to Trump administration.

Title IX prohibits school districts that receive federal funds from discriminating “on the basis of sex.” A Title IX regulation states if school districts maintain separate bathrooms (locker rooms, showers, etc.) “on the basis of sex” they must provide comparable facilities for the other sex.

In a 2015 letter the Department of Education (DOE) interpreted the Title IX regulation to mean that if schools provide for separate boys’ and girls’ bathrooms, transgender students must be allowed to use the bathroom consistent with their gender identity. DOE and the Department of Justice reaffirmed this stance in a May 2016 “Dear Colleague” letter.

On February 22, 2017, DOE issued a “Dear Colleague” letter withdrawing the previous letters. The new “Dear Colleague” letter takes no position on whether the term “sex” in Title IX includes gender identity.

G.G. is transgender. The Gloucester County School Board prevented him from using the boy’s bathroom. He sued the district arguing that is discriminated against him in violation of Title IX.

Continue reading →

 

What Happens Now to Supreme Court Transgender Bathroom Case?

Posted in Case Notes Commentary on By Lann McIntyre

The fate of the most controversial case the Supreme Court has agreed to decide this term is uncertain now that the Department of Education (DOE) has issued a “Dear Colleague” letter withdrawing a previous letter requiring school districts to allow transgender students to use the bathroom consistent with their gender identity.

Title IX prohibits school districts that receive federal funds from discriminating “on the basis of sex.” A Title IX regulation states if school districts maintain separate bathrooms (locker rooms, showers, etc.) “on the basis of sex” they must provide comparable facilities for the other sex. In a 2015 letter, DOE interpreted the Title IX regulation to mean that if schools provide for separate boys’ and girls’ bathrooms, transgender students must be allowed to use the bathroom consistent with their gender identity. The new “Dear Colleague” letter takes no position on whether the term “sex” in Title IX includes gender identity.

G.G. is biologically female but identifies as a male. The Gloucester County School Board prevented him from using the boys’ bathroom. He sued the district arguing that it discriminated against him in violation of Title IX. Continue reading →

 

SCOTUS to Decide Whether Intervenors Must Have Standing

Posted in Case Notes Commentary IMLA Briefs on By Lann McIntyre

The Supreme Court accepts all kinds of cases involving states and local governments. Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates involves a long, complicated story and legal issue.

Steven Sherman sued the Town of Chester alleging an unconstitutional taking as the town refused to approve a subdivision on plots of land Sherman intended to sell to Laroe Estates. Laroe Estates advanced Sherman money for the land in exchange for a mortgage on the property. Sherman defaulted on a loan to a senior mortgage holder who foreclosed on the property.

Laroe Estates, claiming to be the owner of the property, sought to “intervene” in the takings lawsuit. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure grant the right to intervene to non-parties who “claim an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.” 

The district court concluded that Laroe Estates lacked Article III “standing” under the U.S. Constitution to assert a takings claim against the Town. Laroe Estates argued that it was a “contract vendee” of the Sherman property. According to the district court, under longstanding circuit court precedent “contract vendees lack standing to assert a takings claim.”

The question the Supreme Court will decide in Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates is whether Laroe Estates may intervene in this case even though it lacks standing.

Continue reading →

 

Supreme Court to Define Contours of False Arrest Claims

Posted in Case Notes Commentary on By Lann McIntyre

What if a police officer arrests someone because the officer doesn’t believe the person is telling the truth and there is evidence the officer is right?

 In District of Columbia v. Wesby the Supreme Court will decide whether, when the owner of a vacant house informs police he has not authorized entry, an officer assessing probable cause to arrest those inside for trespassing may discredit the suspects’ claims of an innocent mental state.

 Facts similar to those in this case may not arise very often. But police officers must assess claims of innocence in numerous other instances (theft, assault, even homicide). 

 Police officers arrested a group of late-night partygoers for trespass. The party-goers gave police conflicting reasons for why they were at the house (birthday party v. bachelor party). Some said “Peaches” invited them to the house; others said they were invited by another guest. Police officers called Peaches who told them she gave the partygoers permission to use the house. But she admitted that she had no permission to use the house herself; she was in the process of renting it. The landlord confirmed by phone that Peaches hadn’t signed a lease. The partygoers were never charged with trespass.

 The partygoers sued the police officers for violating their Fourth Amendment right to be free from false arrest. To be guilty of trespass the partygoers had to have entered the house knowing they were doing so “against the will of the lawful occupant or of the person lawfully in charge.” The partygoers claimed they did not know they lacked permission to be in the house. 

Continue reading →

 

Travel Ban: What’s Next?

Posted in Commentary on By Lann McIntyre

On February 9 the Ninth Circuit refused to stay a district court’s temporary restraining order disallowing the President’s travel ban from going into effect. The executive order prevents people from seven predominately Muslim countries from entering the United States for 90 days.

 Washington and Minnesota sued President Trump claiming their public universities are harmed because students and faculty of the affected countries cannot travel for research, academic collaboration, or personal reasons. The residents of cities and counties and their families have been affected as well by this executive order.

 The government argued that the President has “unreviewable authority to suspend admissions of any class of aliens.” The Ninth Circuit disagreed stating: “There is no precedent to support this claimed unreviewablity, which runs contrary to the fundamental structure of our constitutional democracy.” 

 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that the states are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the executive order violates the due process rights of lawful permanent residents, non-immigrant visa holders, and refugees. More specifically, the executive order provides no notice and hearing before restricting a person’s right to travel and “contravenes the procedures provided by federal statute for refugees seeking asylum.” Continue reading →

 

What Might Justice Gorsuch Mean for States and Local Governments?

Posted in Commentary on By Lisa Soronen, Executive Director, SLLC

The authors of Searching for Scalia evaluated who on President Trump’s list of potential nominees to replace Justice Scalia’s seat on the Supreme Court would be most like Justice Scalia—the originalist, the textualist, and, most importantly, the conservative. The winner:  Supreme Court nominee Judge Neil Gorsuch!

While just one case is too few to judge any Supreme Court nominee, one case in particular gives states and local governments a reason to be excited about this nomination. Last year Judge Gorsuch (strongly) implied that given the opportunity the U.S. Supreme Court should overrule Quill Corp. v. North Dakota (1992). In Quill, the Supreme Court held that states cannot require retailers with no in-state physical presence to collect sales tax.

While Judge Gorsuch hasn’t ruled on abortion (an issue states care about) his most prominent rulings involve a related issue (the Affordable Care Act birth control mandate), which is not of particular interest to states and local governments.

Interestingly, in the one area of the law where the views of Judge Gorsuch and Justice Scalia differ—agency deference—the views of states and local governments are generally more in-line with Judge Gorsuch’s view.

Continue reading →

 

Federal Agency Deference: SLLC Argues Less is More

Posted in Case Notes IMLA Briefs on By Lisa Soronen, Executive Director, SLLC

If the war to overturn Chevron v. NRDC (1984) is to be won, many battles will probably have to be won first.

 While overturning Chevron is not on the table in Coventry Health Care of Missouri v. Nevils, limiting it is. The State and Local Legal Center (SLLC) asked the Court in its amicus brief to rule that Chevron deference does not apply when an agency is construing the scope of a statute’s preemption provision, absent Congress’s assent.  

 In Chevron v. NRDC the Supreme Court held that courts should defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes. States and local governments generally prefer that courts not defer to federal agency regulations because this deference gives federal agencies a lot of power.  Continue reading →

 

SLLC Supreme Court Amicus Brief Urges Favorable First Amendment Ruling for Local Governments

Posted in Case Notes IMLA Briefs on By Lisa Soronen, Executive Director, SLLC

In Packingham v. North Carolina the Supreme Court will hopefully refine its holding in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona (2015) in a way favorable to local governments.

The issue the Supreme Court will decide in this case is whether a North Carolina statute prohibiting registered sex offenders from accessing social networking websites where they know minors can create or maintain a profile violates the First Amendment. The State and Local Legal Center (SLLC) amicus brief argues this law does not violate the First Amendment.

Continue reading →

 

SLLC Supreme Court Amicus Brief Urges Supreme Court to Pull the Plug on the Provocation Rule

Posted in Case Notes IMLA Briefs on By Lisa Soronen, Executive Director, SLLC

Los Angeles County v. Mendez poses a simple question:  Should police officers be liable for the use of reasonable force (when they have done something they should not have).

In its amicus brief the State and Local Legal Center (SLLC) asks the Supreme Court to reject the “provocation” rule, under which any time a police officer violates the Fourth Amendment and violence ensues, the officer will be personally liable for money damages for the resulting physical injuries.

 In Los Angeles County v. Mendez everyone agrees police officers used reasonable force when they shot Angel Mendez. As officers entered, unannounced, the shack where Mendez was staying they saw a silhouette of Mendez pointing what looked like a rifle at them.  Mendez kept a BB gun in his bed to shoot rats when they entered the shack. Mendez claimed that when the officers entered the shack he was in the process of moving the BB gun so he could sit up in bed. The officers shot Mendez. Continue reading →

 

SCOTUS to Rule on Which Lower Court May Rule on WOTUS

Posted in Case Notes on By Lisa Soronen, Executive Director, SLLC

We are one step closer to the Supreme Court deciding the ultimate question regarding the “waters of the United States” regulations, which is, of course, are they lawful.

The Supreme Court has agreed to decide whether federal courts of appeals versus federal district courts (lower courts) have the authority to rule whether the “waters of the United States” (WOTUS) regulations are lawful.

Numerous states and local governments have challenged the WOTUS regulations. In National Association of Manufacturers v. Department of Defense the Supreme Court will not rule whether the regulations are lawful. Instead, they will simply decide which court gets to take the first crack at deciding whether they are lawful. Continue reading →

 

SLLC Files Supreme Court Amicus Brief in Credit Card Swipe Fees Case

Posted in Commentary IMLA Briefs on By Lisa Soronen, Executive Director, SLLC

Is a Price Speech?

Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, like most First Amendment cases, is about much more than its mere facts, here disallowing retailers to pass on credit-card swipe fees to consumers. It raises a more fundamental question over what exactly is speech.

The question the Supreme Court will decide in this case is whether state “no-surcharge” laws that prohibit vendors from charging more to credit-card customers but allows them to charge less to cash customers violate the First Amendment. The State and Local Legal Center (SLLC) amicus brief argues these laws don’t violate the First Amendment because they regulate conduct rather than speech. Continue reading →

 

Supreme Court Refuses to Hear Internet Sales Tax Case

Posted in Case Notes IMLA Briefs on By Lisa Soronen, Executive Director, SLLC

The Supreme Court refused to hear a case involving the question of whether a Colorado law requiring remote sellers to inform Colorado purchasers annually of their purchases and send the same information to the Colorado Department of Revenue is unconstitutional. As is always the case, the Supreme Court gave no reason for denying the petition.

In Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, decided in 1992, the Supreme Court held that states cannot require retailers with no in-state physical presence to collect sales tax. In 2010 the Colorado legislature passed the law described above to improve sales tax collection. The Direct Marketing Association sued Colorado claiming the law unconstitutionally discriminates against interstate commerce and is unconstitutional under Quill.    Continue reading →

 

False Claims Act Seal Violation Doesn’t Mean Automatic Dismissal of Case

Posted in Case Notes on By Lisa Soronen, Executive Director, SLLC

State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. United States ex rel. Rigsby is the perfect case for an eight member Court. So simple a unanimous Court issued an opinion in about a month after oral argument.

The False Claims Act (FCA) allows third parties to sue on behalf of the United States for fraud committed against the United States. Per the Act a FCA complaint is kept secret “under seal” until the United States can review it and decide whether it wants to participate in the case. Continue reading →

 

Police Officer Liability for Reasonable Force?

Posted in Case Notes Commentary on By Lisa Soronen, Executive Director, SLLC

It is undisputed that police officers used reasonable force when they shot Angel Mendez. As officers entered, unannounced, the shack where Mendez was living they saw a silhouette of Mendez pointing what looked like a rifle at them. Yet, the Ninth Circuit awarded him and his wife damages because the officers didn’t have a warrant to search the shack thereby “provoking” Mendez.

(Mendez kept a BB gun in his bed to shot rats when they entered the shack. Mendez claimed that when the officers entered the shack he was in the process of moving the BB gun so he could sit up in bed.)

In Los Angeles County v. Mendez the Supreme Court must decide whether to accept or reject the Ninth Circuit’s “provocation” rule. Per this rule, “Where an officer intentionally or recklessly provokes a violent confrontation, if the provocation is an independent Fourth Amendment violation, he may be held liable for his otherwise defensive use of deadly force.” Continue reading →

 

Ohio Supreme Court Refuses to Extend Quill to a Business-Privilege Tax

Posted in Case Notes Commentary IMLA Briefs on By Lisa Soronen, Executive Director, SLLC

In Crutchfield v. Testa the Ohio Supreme Court held that Ohio’s commercial activity tax (CAT) applies to online vendors even if they lack a physical presence in the state. More technically, the court refused to extend the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota (1992), that states cannot require retailers with no in-state physical presence to collect sales tax, to Ohio’s privilege-of-doing-business tax.

The State and Local Legal Center (SLLC) filed an amicus brief arguing in favor of this result. Continue reading →

 

Supreme Court Accepts “Some” versus “Meaningful” Special Education Benefits Case

Posted in Case Notes Commentary on By Lisa Soronen, Executive Director, SLLC

You don’t have to be a linguist to understand that there is a wide gap between the meaning of “some” and “meaningful.” The Supreme Court must pick between these words to determine what level of educational benefits students with a disabilities must receive.

The relevance of a special education case to local governments may not be obvious. But depending on how the Supreme Court rules, this case could mean cost increase for some, if not many, school districts. To the extent local governments fund local school districts and/or compete with them for limited state dollars, this case is relevant. Continue reading →

 

Preemption Clause too Narrow? Expand it Via Regulations!

Posted in Case Notes Commentary on By Lisa Soronen, Executive Director, SLLC

Every time a federal agency thinks the scope of a preemption clause in federal law is too narrow may it just write a regulation expanding it? That is the heart of the matter in Coventry Health Care of Missouri v. Nevils.

The question of most interest to state and local governments in this case, more technically, is whether Chevron deference applies to an agency’s regulation construing the scope of a statute’s express-preemption provision. Continue reading →

 

SCOTUS Dismisses Case Involving State and Local Governments Ensuring Private Entities Comply with the ADA

Posted in Case Notes Commentary on By Lisa Soronen, Executive Director, SLLC

In Texas, state law requires most people under age 25 to attend a state-licensed private driver education school to obtain a driver’s license. None of the schools accommodate deaf students. So a number of deaf students sued the Texas Education Agency (TEA) arguing it was required to bring the driver education schools into compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).   

In Ivy v. Morath the Supreme Court was supposed to decide when state and local governments are responsible for ensuring that a private actor complies with the ADA. The Court dismissed the case concluding it was moot most likely because Texas claimed that four of the students suing completed the driver education course and one moved out of state. Continue reading →

 

May Sex Offenders Be Banned From Using Social Networking Sites Like Facebook?

Posted in Case Notes Commentary on By Lisa Soronen, Executive Director, SLLC

The Supreme Court keeps on accepting First Amendment cases—perhaps because among the current Court there is much agreement on the First Amendment, so being down a Justice doesn’t matter. This does not bode well for state and local governments, like North Carolina in this case. For better or worse, this case like Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, accepted in September, gives the Supreme Court a chance to refine its holding in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona (2015).

Continue reading →

 

SCOTUS Takes Qualified Immunity Case Arising out of 9/11 Investigations

Posted in Case Notes Commentary on By Lisa Soronen, Executive Director, SLLC

The Supreme Court has agreed to decide cases accusing federal government officials at the highest levels of mistreating people investigated for possible terrorist connections after 9/11.

All Supreme Court qualified immunity cases, including Ziglar v. Turkmen, Ashcroft v. Turkmen, and Hasty v. Turkmen, affect state and local governments. These cases raise issues that frequently come up in run-of-the-mill qualified immunity cases, in particular, whether the court defined the “established law” at a high level of generality instead of considering the specific facts of the case when deciding whether to grant or deny qualified immunity.

Continue reading →

 

Mesa v. Hernandez: A Qualified Immunity Quandary

Posted in Case Notes Commentary on By Lisa Soronen, Executive Director, SLLC

Qualified immunity cases, generally speaking, could not be more straightforward for state and local governments. No matter how bad the facts of the case, one legal analysis is better.

Mesa v. Hernandez provides a qualified immunity quandary. If Agent Mesa wins his qualified immunity claim, other government officials in the future may lose their qualified immunity claims. 

  Continue reading →

 

State and Local Legal Center Urges Supreme Court to Wait for Right Internet Sales Tax Case

Posted in Case Notes IMLA Briefs on By Lisa Soronen, Executive Director, SLLC

The State and Local Legal Center (SLLC) filed an amicus brief encouraging the Supreme Court to not hear a case arguing that a Colorado law requiring remote sellers to inform Colorado purchasers annually of their purchases and send the same information to the Colorado Department of Revenue is unconstitutional.

Continue reading →